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DES AND THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
by
BARRY S. ROBERTS* and CHARLES F. RoYSTER**
D IETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES), a synthetic estrogen, was developed in 19371 and
was widely prescribed in the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's for pregnant
women to prevent miscarriages.' The drug has caused a number of maladies
to daughters who were exposed in utero to the drug, the most serious of which
is clear cell adenocarcinoma, a rare form of vaginal cancer. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) withdrew its approval of DES as a miscarriage preven-
tative in 1971,1 and since then the focus has shifted to products liability actions
filed against the drug manufacturers. The plaintiffs have been largely
unsuccessful in these actions, although some innovative judicial theories have
recently been advanced in allowing recovery.
This article will examine the history of this drug, how it was used and
regulated as well as the subsequent legal turmoil and the proffered resolutions
to the quandary. The impact of these theories and of proposals to "further
strengthen product liability laws as a substitute for direct government
intervention"' will also be studied.
I. DISCOVERY OF DES
Diethylstilbestrol was first synthesized in 1937 by Dr. E. C. Dodds at
Oxford and Middlesex Hospital in England.5 The abbreviation "DES" is used
to designate diethylstilbestrol (which is also known as stilbestrol) and sometimes
for the related synthetic estrogen, dienestrol, also discovered by Dr. Dodds.'
Diethlystilbestrol represented a tremendous improvement over the use of
natural estrogens. Natural estrogens were very expensive due to the extensive
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill; LL.M., Harvard Law
School; J.D., B.S., University of Pennsylvania.
**Technical Consultant, Book & Co., Winston Salem, North Carolina; J.D., M.B.A., B.S., University
of North Carolina-Chapel Hill.
'See Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 562, 420 A.2d 1305, 1310 (1980); N. SWEIG, DES:
A Comprehensive Perspective (1980) [hereinafter cited as SWEIG].
'Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 998 (1979).
'36 Fed. Reg. 21, 537-38 (1971). See Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation
Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668 n.6 (1981).
'Helms, FDA, in Weidenbaum, On Saving the Kingdom, REGULATION. Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 14, 28.
'Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 562, 420 A.2d at 1310. See also SWEIG. supra note 1, at 2.
'Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 562, 420 A.2d at 1310. Dienestrol suits should be kept separate from
diethylstilbestrol suits. The term DES when used in this article should be read as diethylstilbestrol unless
otherwise indicated.
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hormone isolation process and had to be injected into the buttocks with the
frequent side effect of abscesses.7 DES was much less expensive and it could
be administered orally.'
Dr. Dodds was not connected with any drug manufacture but rather was
working under a grant from the Medical Research Council of Great Britain.
Most significantly, Dr. Dodds never patented DES9 which led to the manufac-
ture of DES by many drug companies and to the tendency for doctors to
prescribe the drug by its generic name (diethylstilbestrol).
II. REGULATORY AND LEGAL STANDARDS
Drug regulation began in the United States in 1890 with limitations on
the importation of adulterated or unwholesome food, drugs, or liquors.' 0 This
was followed by the Food and Drug Act of 1906 ("Wiley Act") which provided
the first direct regulation of drug manufacturers." However, the FDA was not
created until passage of the first comprehensive statute in this area, the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which remains the basis of United
States drug law. 2
The next major change in United States drug laws was passage of the
Kefauver-Harris Amendment of 1962. This, most importantly, amended Section
505 of the 1938 Act to require drugs be effective as well as safe. 3 DES was
originally approved and marketed under the 1938 Act.
Obviously, fulfilling the requirements of the'FDA is a major concern of
drug manufacturers. Compliance does not, however, fully end their legal
responsibilities."' The products liability laws of the various states become
applicable when anyone is harmed by a drug. Evidence of compliance with
FDA requirements may be presented to the jury to show proper care and ade-
quate testing, but such compliance is not conclusive on this issue."
The law has made great strides to allow consumers legal redress against
sellers and manufacturers. The law of products liability can be traced to the
English case of Winterbottom v. Wright. ' 6 This case led the way for the elimina-
'Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (D. Mass. 1981).
'Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.S.C. 1981). DES costs approximately 1/300 as much
as natural estrogens.
VId. at 1009.
'See 26 Stat. 415 (1890).
"See 34 Stat. 768(1906). See generally Janssen, Outline of the History of U.S. Drug Regulation and Labeling,
36 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 420, 429-927 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Janssen].
'Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, asamended, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-91 (1976).
'176 Stat. 781, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976).
"See, e.g., Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 579, 420 A.2d at 1320.
' Id. at 579, 420 A.2d at 1320. Note, however, that if a violation of regulations is shown, a manufacturer
is almost per se liable. Safir, FDA Regulations and Product Liability, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 478,
479 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826).
'10 M.&W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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tion of the privity requirement in tort actions.'" In 1963, in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., I8 a manufacturer was held strictly liable in tort for injuries
sustained due to a defective product. ' 9 This case led the way toward the adop-
tion of strict liability in tort.
The exposure of drug manufacturers can best be understood by analyzing
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate use
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.20
The Restatement, moreover, is accompanied by a number of comments and
guidelines. Most important for purposes of this article is Comment K entitled
"Unavoidably Unsafe Products," which provides in pertinent part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge,
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended or ordinary use.
These are especially common in the field of drugs ... Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warnings
is not defective ... It is ... true in particular of many new or experi-
mental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or
perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is
justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
'Note, supra note 2, at 992. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 641 (4th Ed. 1971).
See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
"59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
"in Greenman, the plaintiff was injured when struck by a piece of wood thrown from a power tool
manufactured by the defendant. The Supreme Court of California held the defendant strictly liable in
tort, thereby avoiding obstacles under a warranty theory. See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 98, at 657.
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Winter, 19831 DES
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recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualifica-
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning
is given, where the situations call for it, is not to be held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attendant with a known but apparently unreasonable risk.2
This exception recognizes the fact that drugs (and especially prescription drugs)
cannot be made completely safe. This is in essence a decision that frequently
the benefit and utility of the drug outweighs its risk, at least if proper warnings
are given.22 Therefore, drug manufacturers are held to the duties of adequately
testing their products and of adequately warning of known dangers.23 Some
courts nevertheless have ruled that Comment K's insulation is lost and strict
liability applies "(1) where the drug could not reasonably have appeared to
be useful and desirable at the time of manufacture or (2) where, despite some
apparent efficacy, the medically recognizable risk feasibly outweighed its
utility." 2,
Regardless of the result of a Comment K analysis, three essential require-
ments remain under traditional products liability doctrine in order for the plain-
tiff to recover. "In order to recover, a plaintiff must show a product is defec-
tive, that the defective product is attributable to the party to be held responsible,
and that the defect in the product caused the plaintiff's injury." 25 The second
requirement has been articulated as the identification requirement. This is where
the DES plaintiffs have the most problem. Due to the long time lapse since
ingestion by their mothers, and poor recordkeeping by pharmacies and doctors,
most plaintiffs "cannot identify the manufacturer of the drug ingested by their
mothers." 2" The identification requirement has clearly been a crucial element.
"It is a fundamental principle of products liability law that a plaintiff must
prove, as an essential element of his case, that a defendant manufacturer actually
made the particular product which caused injury."27
DES plaintiffs face many problems, both legal and practical. Among the
legal problems are: class action certification; the possible running of the statute
"Id. at Comment k. See Safir, supra note 15, at 484.
"See W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 99, at 661. Thus, even under products liability standards, plaintiffs
frequently must show negligence in drug cases. Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES
Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668, 669 n.12 (1981).
"Manufacturers must also warn of dangers they should have known.
"See, e.g., Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 577, 420 A.2d at 1319. This case indicated that DES did not
appear to be reasonably efficacious at the time manufactured and therefore lost Comment k protection.
The case then went on to create market share liability. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
"Note, Industry- Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REV. 980, 997 (1979).
"Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 972 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as FORDHAM Comment].
"Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (citing HURSH & BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODucTs LIABILITY 2d § 1:41 (1974)). Note that the same requirement must also be met under a
warranty analysis. See FORDHAM Comment supra note 26, at 967 n.18, 972 n.27.
[Vol. 16:3AKRON LAW REVIEW
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of limitations; and denial of a cause of action because the injury was prior
to birth or viability.2" The biggest obstacle, however, as already indicated, is
the identification requirement. This is the area in which courts have created
new doctrine and is the principle focus of this article.
III. MEDICAL AND REGULATORY HISTORY
As previously noted, DES was developed in 1937 by Dr. Dodds. Since
it was not patented, many drug companies were interested in marketing it in
the United States. In order to do so, a drug company had to file a New Drug
Application (NDA) pursuant to § 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.2 9 The NDA had to state proposed uses (indications), clinical data and
studies establishing the safety of the drug, chemical composition, manufac-
turing method, and proposed labeling.3"
The first NDA for DES was filed in 1939. Ten firms had made separate
NDA filings by the end of 1940. These NDA's were for the following indica-
tions: "the treatment of post-menopausal symptoms, senile vaginitis, gonorrheal
vaginitis, and suppression of lactation." 3'
The FDA then decided to ask the drug companies to pool their clinical
data. According to Dr. Theodore Klumpp, the Chief of the Drug Division of
the FDA at that time:
It was feared that to consider each [NDA] separately would present "an
overwhelming problem" and so it was decided, "in the public interest,"
to request that the drug companies pool all their clinical materials and
present them together. The companies apparently received this sugges-
tion with little enthusiasm, but accepted it when it was pointed out that
consideration of individually submitted data would mean delay in approv-
ing the applications. As a result, a committee, whose members represented
the drug companies, was formed which put together and summarized all
clinical data supplied by the individual pharmaceutical companies
eventually presenting this data to the FDA.32
"FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 968-71.
"52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976).
"Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1032-33. More specifically, the statute provides in § 505(b):
Any person may file with the Administrator an application with respect to any drug subject
to the provisions of subsection (a). Such person shall submit to the Administrator as part of the
application (1) full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such
drug is safe for use; (2) a full list of articles used as components of such drug; (3) a full statement
of the composition of such drug; (4) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities
and controls used for, the manufacturer, processing, and packing of such drug; (5) such samples
of such drug and of the articles used as components thereof as the Administrator may require;
and (6) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
52 Stat. 1052 (1938). The 1962 Amendments added the requirement that the drug must be shown to be
effective as well as safe. See 76 Stat. 781 (1962).
"See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1033.
"Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 190-91, 406 A.2d 185, 189 (1979).
Another case presented the possibility that at least some odrug companies sought this pooling of data
although most companies were reluctant. See Payton, supra note 7, at 1033.
Winter, 1983] DES
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The drug companies complied with this request and the "small committee"
was formed in early 1941. 33
The FDA, nevertheless, made further requests of uniformity. The com-
panies were required to use the same United States Pharmacopeia standard
so that the active ingredients of all DES products were the same.34 The FDA
also requested that uniform labeling (warnings and dosages) be used. 35 Finally,
the FDA requested that the companies include a "permissions clause" in their
NDA's. This clause allowed any company to refer to the "master file" of clinical
studies in their NDA's.36 In 1941, the FDA began approving the NDA's for
the four indications previously noted.37
Meanwhile, research was begun in the 1940's into the use of DES in the
treatment of problems of pregnancy. Apparently, all research was originally
done by independent medical researchers,3" although the drug companies later
cooperated by supplying DES to the researchers.39
In 1947, several drug companies submitted supplemental NDA's in order
to market DES as a miscarriage preventative.4 ° These applications referred to
the independent research done, particularly that of Drs. 0. Smith and George
Smith of Boston.4 ' The companies did not, however, conduct laboratory tests
on pregnant laboratory animals.42 This later became a claim of inadequate testing
in several DES cases.
The FDA began approving these NDA's in 1947 based upon all available
information. Eventually approximately 300 companies marketed DES43 in
various dosages and for various indications.
In 1952 the FDA declared that DES was no longer a "New Drug" but
"See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1033.
"Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 563, 420 A.2d at 1311. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(j), 351(b) (1976).
"See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1033. This was largely achieved.
"See Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 563, 420 A.2d at 1311.
7Id. at 563, 420 A.2d at 1311. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
"See Lyons, 120 N.J. Super. at 191, 406 A.2d at 189.
"See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1034.
"A supplemental NDA is required whenever the drug is recommended for a new indication, or a change
in dosages or sizes. Any such change makes it a "new drug" within the definition of § 201(p) of the 1938
Act. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
"Reports of this research abounded in the medical literature starting around 1945. Ryan, 514 F. Supp.
at 1010. Two key sources were later questioned: Karnky, The Use of Stilbestrolfor the Treatment of
Threatened and Habitual Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 34 S. MED. J. 838 (1942);
Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the Prevention and Treatment of Complications of Pregnancy, 56 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 821 (1948). See generally FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 963 n.2.
"See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1034; Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 322-23, 436 N.Y.S.2d
625, 629 (1981).
"4See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1011. The estimates vary considerably and the 300 figure may include distributors
or packagers, see FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 964, n.3. For other estimates see SWIG, supra
note 1, at 2 (200 Firms); Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1034 (a high of 151 firms); Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super.
at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312 (287 firms).
[Vol. 16:3
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Winter, 19831 DES 43
was instead "generally recognized as safe" under § 201(p) of the 1938 Act. 4
This meant that a drug company could now enter the DES market without
submitting an NDA, thus prompting a great number of manufactures to enter
the market. 45 The new companies had only to meet the manufacturing standards
and to market the drug for the previously approved indications.4 6
During the period 1947-1971 DES was widely prescribed as a miscarriage
preventative. It was estimated that between 500,000 and 2,000,000 pregnant
women used the drug. 7 High dosages were needed when DES was used as a
miscarriage preventative. The most popular tablet for this indication was the
25 mg. size. Multiple tablets of lower dosages, primarily 5 mg. and 10 mg.,
were also probably prescribed."
In 1967, the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council
(NAS-NRC) completed its review, required by the 1962 Drug Amendments, 9
of the efficacy of DES. The NAS-NRC rated DES as "possibly effective" as
a miscarriage preventative. 0 The FDA, however, delayed further action until
1971.51
By 1971, the link between DES used in pregnancy and the development
of vaginal cancer in DES exposed daughters was well demonstrated. 2 This form
of cancer, adenocarcinoma, is rare, and in fact the incidence rate in DES exposed
daughters is still fairly low. 53 There have been approximately 250 reported cases
of adenocarcinoma in DES exposed daughters. 4 Further, although the disease
"See 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (1976).
"'See Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
"See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1011.
4'Comment, Market Share Liability and DES - Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories: Square Pegs in Round
Holes, 13 CONN. L. REV. 373, 781 (1981). Another source estimated the exposure to be six million B.
SEAMON & G. SEAMON, WOMEN AND THE CRISIS IN SEX HORMONES (1977) [hereinafter cited as SEAMON].
"SWEIG supra note 1, at 5.
"Kefauver-Harris Amendments, 76 Stat. 681 (1912), Pub. L. No. 37-781 (current version contained within
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976)).
""Possibly effective" was defined as having "little evidence of effectiveness under any of the criteria
stated." SEAMAN, supra note 47, at 15. See generally 4 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. (CCH) 71,068 (NAS-
NCR review). The possible ratings are: "effective, probably effective, possibly effective, effective but (some
counterveiling consideration was named), or lacking substantial evidence of effectiveness for each label
indication." 4 FOOD DRUG CosM. L. REP. (CCH) 71,071 (DESI). Under the DESI (Drug Efficacy Study
Implementations) program approval for a drug classified as less than effective will be withdrawn unless
the manufacturer can submit sufficient evidence of effectiveness. Id. at 71,071.
"See SEAMAN, supra note 47, at 14 (includes report of Rep. L. H. Fountain's hearings on the delay).
"See FERRIGNO, 175 N.J. Super. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312; Herbst, Ulfeder & Paskanzer, Adenocarcinoma
of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women,
284 NEw ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 878 (1971); R. PATTERSON, MALPRATICE AND PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACTIONS INVOLVING DRUGS at 86 (1976).
"Div. of Cancer Control & Rehabilitation, National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human
Services, DESAD Project, Questions and Answers About DES Exposure During Pregnancy and Before
Birth, NIH Pub. No. 80-1118 at 7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DES Questions], (incidence rate of
approximately 1.4 out of 10,000).
111d. at 9. Other estimates are as high as 350 to 400 cases. See Hecht, DES: The Drug With Unsuspected
Legacies, FDA CONS. May 1979, at 14, 15 (350 cases). The number of adenocarcinoma cases being
discovered should be declining since the peak discovery period is between 17 and 21 years of age and use 7
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is serious, its treatment is extremely effective if it is detected in its early stages."
DES daughters, nevertheless, suffer from other health problems as well.
The most common is adenosis, which is the abnormal presence of glandular
tissue in the vagina.5 6 Current research indicates that adenosis is not a pre-
cancerous condition 7 and that it may tend to disappear over time."8 Apparently,
daughters exposed earlier in pregnancy have a higher incidence of adenosis. 5"
DES daughters have also developed structural abnormalities other than
adenosis. 6° Furthermore, there is a slightly increased risk of an unfavorable
pregnancy (for DES exposed daughters) according to the National Cooperative
Diethylstilbestrol Adenosis Project (DESAD Project). 61 There does not,
however, appear to be any carryover to the children of DES daughters as of
yet, although research is continuing. 62 There have been some reports of non-
cancerous abnormalities of DES exposed sons, but, it does not appear that
there is any cancer risk.63
In 1971, the FDA issued a warning which required a labeling change which
contraindicted the use of DES during pregnancy. 6" By contraindicting the use
of DES as a miscarriage preventative declined greatly after 1962 (NAS/NRC review). The 25 mg. dosage
was not, of course, removed from the market until 1971 See id. at 15; DES Questions, supra note 53, at 3.
"DES Questions, supra note 53, at 7.
6Comment, supra note 47, at 782 (30-90% of exposed daughters developed adenosis). But see SWEIG.
supra note 1, at 5 (contending that 39-40% develop adenosis).
"Hecht, supra note 54, at 15. See also Antonioli, Burke & Freidman, Natural History of Diethylstilbestrol-
Associated Genital Tract Lesions: Cervical Ectopy and Cervicovaginal Hood, 137 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 841, 852-53 (1980).
"DES Questions, supra note 53, at 13.
"Id. at 10; Comment supra note 47, at 782 n.32.
"DES Questions, supra note 53, at 3.
"Barnes, Colton, Gundersen, Noller, Tilley, Strama, Townsend, Hatab & O'Brien, Fertility and Outcome
of Pregnancy in Women Exposed in Utero to Diethylstilbestrol, 302 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 609
(1980). The DESAD Project studied 618 DES exposed daughters and compared them to a control group
of 618. The DES daughters experienced a 38% rate of unfavorable outcome of pregnancy (miscarriage,
premature birth, pregnancy outside the uterous, or still-birth). One observer analyzed the data as follows:
On a specific breakdown of these cases, we find that DES exposed daughters appear to have had
a substantially higher pregnancy risk of the following problems:
1) a 69% higher risk of 'any unfavorable outcome';
2) a 61% increase in miscarriage;
3) a 177% increase in the chances of having a stillbirth or ectopic [outside uterous] pregnancy;
4) a 71% high level of premature births; and
5) an almost threefold increase of not having a full-term live birth.
SWEIG, supra note 1, at 4.
6"See DES Questions, supra note 53, at 3.
"Id. at 4.
"36 Fed. Reg. 21, 537-38 (1971). The warning acknowledged the link with acenocarcinoma, and listed
pregnancy as a contraindication. The required warning stated:
A statistically significant association has been reported between maternal ingestion during pregnancy
of diethylstilbestrol and the occurrence of vaginal carcinoma developing years later in the offspring.
Whether such an association is applicable to all estrogens is not known at this time. In any event,
estrogens are not indicated for use during pregnancy.
FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 966 n. I. These FDA actions in effect removed the 25 mg. DES
from the market since that size was only approved for use as a miscarriage preventative.
[Vol. 16:3
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of DES as a miscarriage preventative, the FDA removed its approval of the
drug for that use.
Thus, after 1971 DES was no longer used as a miscarriage preventative.
It is very hard not to sympathize with the DES plaintiffs, especially those who
have developed adenocarcinoma. 65 Yet, DES should not be viewed as a total
mistake. It is still an approved drug for many indications, and several com-
panies still produce it, although in lower dosages.1
IV. DES LITIGATION
The number of pending DES suits is tremendous. There are over 1,000
suits pending today. 67 As one writer observed, "given the magnitude of the
potential liabilities, these DES cases in the aggregate appear to this writer very
much like a tidal wave, still miles out to sea, but sweeping inexorably toward
shore." 68
Further, these products liability actions appear to be an inefficient method
of compensating the plaintiffs. In a general drug products liability suit, one
observer estimated that the plaintiff receives only thirty cents out of a dollar
after attorney fees and costs are deducted.69 As we have seen, DES cases are
even more complicated than the average drug case. The defendant drug
manufacturers obviously do not fare well either. The minimum defense costs
of a "simple" DES case has been estimated at $50,000.70 The national total
in claims alone could reach $40 billion.71
Defendants have prevailed in the vast majority of DES cases decided to
date;72 the usual reason being the plaintiffs' failiure to identify the manufac-
"There is much popular literature supporting the plight of the DES daughters. See e.g., SEAMAN, supra
note 47; M. MERKIN, PREGNANCY AS A DISEASE (1977); J. BICHLER, DES DAUGHTER (1981).
"See Approved Drug List, 4 FOOD DRUG COSM. REP. (CCH) 71,247.04 (current manufacturers include
Lilly, Squibb, Westoward, Tablicaps, and Dome/Miles Labs); PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 1055 (35th
Ed. 198 1) [hereinafter cited as PDR]. Only Lilly is listed in the current PDR. The "boxed warning" required
to appear on the labeling states: "1. PROLONGED USE OF ESTROGENS HAS BEEN REPORTED
TO INCREASE THE RISK OF ENDOMETRIAL CARCINOMA. 2. ESTROGENS SHOULD NOT BE
USED DURING PREGNANCY" Id. at 1055. Approved uses include severe menopausal symptoms, atrophic
vaginities, Kraurosis vulvae, female hypogonadism, female castration, primary ovarian failure, breast cancer,
and prostate cancer Id. at 1055-56. Apparently, DES as also been used as a "morning-after pill" (post-
coital contraceptive) despite lack of FDA approval and strong warning in the current PDR. See id. at
1055; R. PATTERSON, supra note 52, at 87.
"Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A.J. 827. See Comment, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories - A High Water Mark in Tort Law?, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 655, 656.
6'Henderson, DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave Approaches Shire, 3 CORP. L. REV. 143, 143 (1980).
"'See P. MUNCH, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE TORT SYSTEM IF VIEWED AS A COMPENSATION SYSTEM (June
1977) (published thesis as part of Rand Paper Series) 29.
"See, Comment, supra note 47, at 802 n.137. Another scholar put the estimate closer to $100.000. See
SWEIG, supra note 1, at 7.
"See Henderson, Products Liability, 3 CORP. L. REV. 143, 148 (1980).
"Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 597, 607 P.2d 924, 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 135-36,
cert. denied. 449 U.S. 912 (1980). One large verdict for the plaintiff was recently overturned. Needham
v. White Laboratories, 639 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1981) (dienestrol case). As of late 1980 one observer noted
that no DES plaintiff has actually collected any damage payments due to appeals. See SWEIG, supra note
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turer. The plaintiffs have attempted to overcome this obstacle by asserting two
traditional theories, alternative liability and concert of action, as well as
proffering two novel theories. The first of these novel theories was initially
presented in a 1978 law review comment entitled "DES and a Proposed Theory
of Enterprise Liability." 7 3 This excellent and often-cited article began the trend
toward enterprise or market share liability. The second development was the
California case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories . 7 Sindell proposed a market
share approach to the DES identification problem. Sindell will first be discussed
since it contains a discussion of all of the proposed theories.
A. Sindell
In Sindell the Supreme Court of California held four-to-three that the plain-
tiff's action should not have been dismissed solely because the plaintiff could
not identify the manufacturer of the DES they had been exposed to in utero.
Instead of requiring specific identification, the Court said that upon a show-
ing that the manufacturers joined as defendants 75 produced a "substantial
percentage of the drug in question ' 76 each manufacturer would be held liable
for his share of the market.
In dissent, Judge Richardson noted practical and theoretical deficiencies
in the majority's reasoning. The dissent felt that such a drastic change in products
liability law should have a legislative rather than judicial source. 7 By obviating
the required proof of cause-in-fact, the dissent observed that Sindell was indeed
"a new high watermark in tort law."71 8
Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought suit against eleven drug companies and
100 "Does." She sued on behalf of herself and on behalf of all similarly situated
women of California. She developed a malignant bladder tumor which was
surgically removed, and suffers from adenosis. Sindell stated that she was unable
to identify the manufacturer, and her case was therefore dismissed at trial.80
1, at 12. Since that time a plaintiff has won an appeal although not at the highest level. See Bichler v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981) (verdict for $500,000).
"FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26.
7'Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal Rptr. 132, cert denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980). Justice Mosk wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justices Newman
and White.
"The defendants in Sindell were Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., E.R. Squibb & Son, the Upjohn
Co., and Rexall Drug Co.
'Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
"Id. at 614-22, 607 P.2d at 938-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 146-51. Joining Justice Richardson in dissent were
Justices Clark and Manuel.
"Id. at 641, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
"The proposed class consisted of "girls and women who are residents of California and who have been
exposed to DES before birth and who may or may not have known that fact or the danger to which they
were exposed." Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133 n.I.
"Id. at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Plaintiff Maureen Rogers filed a similar suit. After
the dismissal below, however, she amended her complaint to allege that Eli Lilly & Co. was the manufacturer
of the DES taken by her mother. The Sindell opinion allows consolidation, but the reasoning applies to
Rogers only if she later fails to adequately identify Eli Lilly as the manufacturer. Id. at 596-97, 607 P.2d
at 927, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
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The Sindell opinion recognizes the plight of the plaintiff who cannot meet
the identification requirement. It must be remembered that the identification
problem in DES cases is due to the long latency period before the adverse
reactions develop, the delay before the cancer relationship was established, and
the fact that DES tended to have been marketed generically."'
Sindell then analyzed the case under several theories. It rejected the follow-
ing: alternative liability;82 concert of action;83 and enterprise liability. Each
of these theories will be examined in later sections of this article.
After finding existing theories inapplicable, Sindell fashioned a new theory,
market share liability. The Court, nevertheless, stated that the theory is merely
a modification of the alternative liability theory of Summers v. Tice."s The
Sindell majority boldly based its market share theory on the policy grounds
that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should
bear the cost of injury." 86 Justice Mosk observed:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science
and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and
which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The response of the courts
can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those
injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing
needs."
Fashion a remedy they did. Under the market share liability theory, plain-
tiffs are required to join a "substantial share"88 of DES manufacturers and
prove that each was negligent. Each defendant is then allowed to show that
his product could not have caused the plaintiff's harm. If not absolved, each
defendant will be liable "by the percentage which the DES sold by each of
them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production
of the drug by all for that purpose. '"89
The dissent too felt sorry for the plaintiffs, but felt that the majority's
"See id. at 601, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138; Comment, supra note 47, at 783.
"Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
"Id. at 603-06, 607 P.2d at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41.
"Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The enterprise theory was as previously noted, proposed
in the FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26.
"33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, the court shifted the burden of proof on causation from
the plaintiff, who was struck by one bullet, to the two defendants, who had each negligently fired their
guns while hunting. The defendants would face joint and several liability if neither could absolve themselves.
'Sindell26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The Sindellcourt said that Comment
h to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (the Summers rule) invited such a modification of the
Summers rule if future conditions warranted.
"Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
"Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, states that
this should be 75-80%, but Sindell leaves it open.
"Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Defendants are also allowed to cross-
complaint other manufacturers not originally joined.
11
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solution was too large a break from prior doctrine. Justice Richardson stated:
The majority adopts a wholly new theory which contains these ingredients:
The plaintiffs were not alive at the time of the commission of the tortious
acts. They sue a generation later. They are permitted to receive substan-
tial damages from multiple defendants without any proof that any defen-
dant caused or even probably caused plaintiffs' injuries.9"
The dissent would abide by prior case law which required identification unless
the case fell within one of the exceptions that California recognizes, which even
the majority dismissed as inapplicable. 9'
Since the plaintiff joined only five drug manufacturers, the dissent observed
that it was far from certain that the manufacturer who actually caused the
injuries was joined.92 The majority countered this by their "substantial percen-
tage" requirement and by noting that the plaintiff claimed that Eli Lilly and
five or six other producers accounted for 90 percent of the DES market.93 The
dissent further argued that by having only 5 of 200 manufacturers, the alter-
native liability theory or its derivatives should be inapplicable. 9
The dissent would adhere to the requirement that causation in fact be
proven. Justice Richardson felt courts should resist the "deep pocket theory
of liability" and further observed that plaintiffs who could not make a specific
identification would be rewarded by "being offered both a wider selection of
potential defendants and a greater opportunity for recovery." 95 In addition,
Justice Richardson continued his assault by asserting:
10Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
"See also McCrerry v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). In this case the
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants because the plaintiff admitted she could
not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES her mother took. Accord, Gray v. United States, 445
F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
'
2 Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Remember
that there were at least 200 manufacturers of DES, with some estimates as high as 300. See supra note
43 and accompanying text.
"Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Obviously developing this market
data will be difficult, and estimates vary. The following table is one estimate:
% Share - % Share -
Company All Indications Miscarriage Preventions
Eli Lilly 46 33
Squibb 9 10
Upjohn 6 7
Schering-Plough 1-2 3-4
American Home Products 1-2 3
Merck 1-2 3
Sterling Drug 1-2 2
Abbott Laboratories 1 I
All Others 32 36
100o00 100%
SWElI, supra note 1, at 13.
9Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
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The "market share" thesis may be paraphrased. Plaintiffs have been hurt
by someone who made DES. Because of the lapse of time no one can
prove who made it. Perhaps it was not the named defendants who made
it, but they did make some. Although DES was apparently safe at the
time it was used, it was subsequently proven unsafe as to some daughters
of some users. Plaintiffs have suffered injury and defendants are wealthy.
There should be a remedy. Strict products liability is unavailable because
the element of causation is lacking. Strike that requirement and label what
remains "alternative" liability; "industry-wide" liability, or "market
share" liability, proving thereby that if you hit the square peg hard and
often enough the round holes will really become square, although you
may splinter the board in the process.
96
The dissent concluded by observing the "omnious ramifications" of the
majority's theory. It questioned whether the pharmaceutical industry should
be made an insurer for any and all injuries attributable to drugs.97 Justice
Richardson suggested that a legislative approach would be preferable, in par-
ticular a system "which would establish and appropriate funds for the educa-
tion, identification, and screening of persons exposed to DES, and would pro-
hibit health care and hospital service plans from excluding or limiting coverage
to person exposed to DES." 9
B. Alternative Liability
The case of Summers v. Tice99 created the theory of alternative liability,
or double fault and alternative liability.1"' In Summers, two hunters
simultaneously and negligently fired their guns in the same direction. One bullet
hit their companion, the plaintiff Summers. Clearly only one of the defendants
actually caused the injury, but identification was not possible. The Court
therefore shifted the burden of proof or cause-in-fact to the defendants. If they
could not absolve themselves, joint and several liability results. 1 '
The "DES Comment" argued that alternative liability could be used to
solve the DES identification problem.'0I The author, however, admits that the
reasoning must be strained a bit, but concludes that the theory is viable on
policy grounds since the plaintiffs are innocent and the defendants were all
tortfeasors. 103
"Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 147-48 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
97Id. at 621, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 621-22, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dissenting). The legislature responded
by enacting a DES Program. This program puts emphasis on finding and treating DES victims. It is funded
by the state. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 349.0-.5 (West Supp. 1982).
"33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) See supra note 85.
'"W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 41, at 243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 433(3) (1965).
"'See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 985; Note, supra note 2, at 1007-08.
"'FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 990-91.
"'Id. at 991. The author would obviously prefer courts to use the enterprise liability theory however. In
justifying alternative liability, the author analogizes the res ipsa loquitur cases and Ybarra v. Spangard,
13
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Other commentators have rejected the alternative liability theory for DES
cases.' 0 4 The chief reason why Summers should not apply is that in Summers
all the potentially responsible parties were joined, this is clearly not true in the
DES cases. Indeed, it is quite possible that the actual defendant would not be
before the court. 05 Other distinctions include that in Summers, the negligence
caused the identification problem, yet in the DES cases the problem was largely
caused by the lapse of time, 1 6 and in Summers, the defendants arguably had
better access to the information than the plaintiff, although this is more ques-
tionable in the DES cases. 0 7
The Sindell majority rejected the alternative liability theory for many of
these same reasons. The key reason was that not all possible responsible parties
were joined.100 The Court also considered, but did not rest its decision on, the
fact that the defendants had no greater access to information which might
facilitate identification.0 9 It must be remembered that this is the Court that
decided the key precedents for the alternative liability theory, Ybarra v. Spangard
and Summers v. Tice, and it found the theory inapplicable to DES cases." '
It seems clear that alternative liability cannot be the solution to the DES
identification problem. The one authority which justified it, the "DES
Comment," did so only as an alternative to its main proposed theory. As one
author stated:
Applying the theory of alternative liability to DES litigation, wherein an
entire industry may be held liable for an unforeseeable reaction to a pro-
duct arguably produced in the public interest, goes far beyond the cir-
cumstances of a nonrecurring hunting accident. In the context of DES
litigation, the benefit of alternative liability to the plaintiff's ultimate
recovery may strain the very notion of "fairness" upon which the
Summers decision was based."'
Nevertheless, some courts, including the lower court in Sindell, have employed
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1948) to the DES cases and concludes that if the majority of DES manufacturers
are joined, then alternative liability can apply even though not all the potentially responsible parties are
present. Id. at 988-95. In Ybarra, the plaintiff became paralyzed in his shoulder following an appendectomy.
He sued the doctors and nurses who participated in the operation. The Supreme Court of California shifted
the burden of going forward to the plaintiffs based largely upon alternative liability theory. See id. at 989-90.
See supra note 47, at 784-91; Note, supra note 2, at 1008.
"'Note, supra note 2, at 1008.
"'Id. at 1009. Obviously the plaintiffs could argue that the drug manufacturers were negligent in their
record keeping.
"'Comment, supra note 47, at 788-89. Superior access to information may not be a requirement in order
to shift the causation burden, but it is a factor to be considered. The drug manufacturers do not have
better information since the drugs were distributed through distributors, and due to the passage of time
physicians and pharmacy records have been lost or destroyed.
'"'Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
'"Id. at Cal. 3d at 601-02, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
"See supra notes 99 and 103 and accompanying text.
"'Comment, supra note 47, at 785.
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the alternative liability theory in DES cases."I2 One case, Abel v. Eli Lilly &
Co.," 3 held that the theory stated a sufficient cause of action, and another,
Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly, I" used alternative liability in fashioning a market share
approach. It must be noted that Ferrigno was severly criticized in a subsequent
case also before the New Jersey Superior Court, Namm v. Frosst and Co."5
Namm flatly rejected the theory of alternative liability." 6
C. Concert of Action
The concert of action theory is based upon the requirement of a "common
plan or design to commit a tortious act." "7 Actual agreement is not necessary,
but the court must find a tacit understanding and tortious acts pursuant to
the common plan. As with alternative liability, the defendants under a concert
of action theory are held jointly and severally liable." 8
The classic fact situation for concert of action to be applied is the illegal
drag race. The agreement or tacit understanding can be inferred from the parallel
conduct of the participants.'
This theory was argued in Sindell, and the "DES Comment" also argues
it as a viable theory for DES cases. The "DES Comment" argued that the
case of Hall v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 20 supports this position.
In Hall, thirteen children were injured by the explosion of dynamite blasting
caps.' 2' The specific manufacturer could not be identified since all markings
2149 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
"'94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979).
'4175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
"178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981).
"
61d. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128. Namm also rejected the theory of enterprise liability.
.'W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 41, at 292. The concert of action theory has very solid and old
underpinnings. According to Prosser, the original concept was as follows:
All persons who acted in concert to commit a trespass, in pursuance of a common design, were
held liable for the entire result. In such a case there was a common purpose, with mutual aid in
carrying it out; in short, there was a joint enterprise, so that "all coming to do an unlawful act,
and of one point, the act of one is the act of all of the same party being present."
Id., § 46, at 291 and n.3 (quoting Sir John Heydon's Case, 1613, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 7 Eng. Rep. 1150). A
current definition is:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take
part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer,
or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him.
Id., §46, at 292. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965).
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability
if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him
or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constituted
a breach of duty to the third person.
"W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 46, at 291-92. It differs from alternative liability in that all defendants
are jointly and severally liable with no opportunity to absolve themselves.
I"See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 978-79.
2345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
"'Id. at 359.
Winter, 1983) DES
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on the caps were destroyed in the explosion. 22 The plaintiffs, therefore, sued
the six American manufacturers of blasting caps and their trade association
under the concert of action theory.'23 The court held for the plaintiffs upon
finding that the manufacturers had known of the dangerous nature of their
product but had agreed among themselves not to place warnings on the caps.
The effect of this holding was to shift the burden of proof on identification
to the defendants.' 24 The "DES Comment" author contends that, in the DES
situation there is enough conscious parallel behavior involved in the pooling
of clinical data and other cooperative activity by the drug manufacturers in
1941 to find concerted action.' 25
The Sindell Court nevertheless refused to apply the concert of action theory
because they could not find a tacit understanding or a common plan among
the drug manufacturers. Most of the activity alleged to be parallel was indeed
required by law. 1 26 Justice Mosk admitted:
Application of the concert of action to this situation would expand the
doctrine far beyond its intended scope and would render virtually any
manufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even
if it could be demonstrated that the product, which caused the injury was
not made by the defendant.
127
A good reason not to apply the concert of action theory is the pervasive
regulation by the FDA. The testing, manufacturing, and marketing of drugs
is all highly regulated. 28 Further, Hall is clearly distinguishable from the DES
situation. In Hall, the entire industry was joined as it consisted of small number
of firms, and the identification problem in Hall was caused by the explosion
itself.12
9
Although most courts have rejected the concert of action theory in DES
cases, 130 the theory has, nevertheless, found some support. The lower court
in Sindell applied this theory as well as alternative liability.' 3' In Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 32 a case involving a DES action against only that named manufac-
"'Id. at 378.
'111d. at 359.
11"Id. at 380.
"'FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 981-83.
"'The manufacturers were (and are) required to use the same formula set forth in the United States
Pharmacopoeia. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41; 21 U.S.C. §
351(b) (1976).
"'Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr.
"See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (premarketing testing); 21 U.S.C. § 351(b) (1976) (misbranding); Comment,
supra note 47, at 794-95.
"'See Note, supra note 2, at 1008-09. In Hall, the manufacturers had agreed not to place warnings on
the blasting caps.
"See generally Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,
512 F. Supp. 1031 (D. Mass. 1981); Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 588, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
"148 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
"79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
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turer, the New York appellate court ruled there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's finding of concerted action.' 33 The reasoning of this case
has been criticized, in particular because of the reliance placed by the court
upon parallel activity by the drug companies prior to their efforts to seek
approval of DES as a miscarriage preventative. ,3 Another DES case, Abel v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 3 I approved the concert of action theory as having stated a
cause of action which should go to the jury.
D. Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability is the term used for the theory developed by the author
of the "DES Comment." According to the author, it is available whenever
the plaintiff cannot identify the cause-in-fact of the injury. The elements of
enterprise liability as stated are:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative
agent and such liability [sic] is due to the nature of the defendant's
conduct.
2) A generically defective product was manufacturered by all the
defendents.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
"'The court stated:
In the instant case, there was ample evidence from which a jury could determine Lilly was engaged
in concerted action. The original cooperation by the 12 manufacturers and pooling of information,
the agreement on the same basic chemical formula, and the adoption of Lilly's literature as a model
for package inserts for joint submission to the FDA in 1941, can rationally be construed as an
express agreement for purposes of finding concerted action, even if such cooperation was first invited
by the FDA .... There was evidence in abundance of conscious parallel activity thereafter by the
drug companies which later sought FDA approval of DES for use in treating risks of pregnancy,
evidence from which may be inferred a tacit understanding.
Id. at 330, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
"4A New Jersey case held the pre-1947 activities to be irrelevant. The court in Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Labs, Inc. stated:
The 1940 applications do not support the "drag race" analogy because there was nothing anti-
social about placing DES on the market for its pre-1947 purposes. Plaintiffs apparently overlook
the fact that products containing DES are still in use today with full approval of the FDA and
the Surgeon General. It can hardly be said, therefore that the drug companies' conduct in seeking
approval for the drug in 1940 should be classified as tortious.
Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., 170 N.J. Super. 183, 194, 406 A.2d 185, 190-91.
Bichler, moreover, has been severely criticized. One observer commented:
Not only does this instruction represent a broad departure from traditional tort notions of concert
of action and even from antitrust application of the theory of conscious parallelism, but the very
evidence cited by the Bichler opinion to support the jury's finding that Lilly participated in concerted
conduct with other drug manufacturers is inconsistent with established principles of products liability
law.... Thus, although the conduct of the original 12 drug manufacturers may indeed be defined
as a joint undertaking, it cannot be deemed tortious and therefore it necessarily falls well outside
the doctrine of concerted action.
Birnbaum, DES Concert-of-Action Theory: New Cases Bring Confusion, NATL. L.J., May 5, 1981, at
32. Bichler, in effect, imposed absolute liability, although Lilly was allowed to bring in other manufacturers.
See Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 331, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
'94 Mich.App. 59, 389 N.W.2d 20 (1979). Abel also ruled the alternative liability theory was sufficient
to take the case to the jury. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 17
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4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was
a member.
5) There is a clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was
caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For example,
the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such
defective products on the market at the time of plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to
the manufacture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whatever
cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty, or strict liability. 1
36
Enterprise liability was developed specifically for the identification pro-
blem of the DES cases. After proving these elements the burden of proof or
causation is shifted to the defendants. Any defendant can then absolve himself
by showing that his product could not have caused the injury. 3 ' In order to
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard of element number five, a
plaintiff must join manufacturers of "a high percentage of the defective pro-
ducts on the market, approximately 75% to 80%."18
This theory was designed to correct some of the logical inconsistencies
found when trying to fit DES cases into concert-of-action or alternative liability
theories. 39 The author justifies the theory upon a basic policy argument that
the United States drug industry, as a whole, caused this problem and that it,
therefore, should be liable. Further, the author stated that by the use of self-
insurance and captive insurers, the drug industry can better afford to pay the
cost. Other policy arguments include: that enterprise liability would provide
incentives for the drug companies to improve their testing and adverse reaction
reporting systems; that the drug industry is financially sound and can easily
afford these losses; that drug companies presently do not spend sufficient
amount of funds on research and development; and that any losses could be
easily passed along to the consumer through higher prices."'
The Sindell court rejected enterprise liability by first distinguishing Hall,
upon which the theory relies. '4 Justice Mosk felt that the differences between
a six-member blasting cap industry and the DES industry of over 200 firms
were simply too great.'42 Most importantly, however, the Sindell majority felt
"16FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 995.
"'Id. at 995. For example, a drug company could show that they never made (or note at that time) a
pill in that size, shape, color, or strength. Note that DES made for use as a miscarriage preventative was
usually of a dosage of 25 mg., while DES made for other uses was usually 5 mg. See SWEIG. supra note
1, at 2.
"'FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 996.
"Id. at 998-1000.
"'Id. at 1003-06.
"'See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
"'Sindell 26 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 607 P.2d at 934-35, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 142-43.
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that it was unfair to condemn the industry for standards which were so highly
compelled by the federal government. Justice Mosk stated:
But since the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the
criteria for the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose
upon a manufacturer liability for injuries resulting from the use of a drug
which it did not supply simply because it followed the standards of the
industry.""
There are also several policy considerations which argue against the theory
of enterprise liability. It remains questionable whether a drug manufacturer
should be held liable for a product which only "could" have caused the injury.
As already noted, plaintiffs who cannot identify the manufacturer will be favored
over those who can by having a larger pool of defendants. Further, expansion
of manufacturers' liability will further increase the cost of products liability
insurance, if it is indeed available at all. It is highly questionable whether liability
here will serve any deterence function since the injuries were arguably not
foreseeable to begin with."' Apparently, no court has adopted the enterprise
liability theory as proposed in the "DES Comment."' 5
E. Market Share Liability
As previously discussed, Sindell created the theory of market share
liability.' 6 Justice Richardson, in dissent, aptly recognized that although the
majority rejected enterprise or industry-wide liability, the difference between
it and the majority's market share liability was a difference of form rather than
substance." 7
The theories are not, however, identical. As already noted, enterprise
liability requires a 75-80%70 joinder while Sindell requires only a "substantial
share." 4 8 The theoretical differences of each theory have been observed by
many commentators."' One writer observed that allocatoin under enterprise
liability is based on a national market, the Sindell approach is presumably based
on the California market."I Similarly, each defendant under enterprise liability
" Ild., at 610, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. See generally 21 C.F.R. §§ 436.100-.542 (1982)
(testing); 21 C.F.R. § 429.10 (1982) (packing); 21 C.F.R. § 369.20 (1982) (warnings); 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.22-.208
(1982) (manufacturing standards).
'"See Note, supra note 2, at 1009-15.
"The author of this article could find no cases which specifically adopted it, although it must be recognized
that the Sindell approach is substantially the same.
"'See supra notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text.
"Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148. See Comment, supra note 47, at 799.
"4See supra notes 88 and 138.
"'See generally, supra note 47; Note, Industry- Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages,
15 GA. L. REV. 423 (1981); Note, supra note 3.
"'Comment, supra note 47, at 811-12. Obviously, the determination of the relevant market will be difficult.
An argument in favor of a national market was presented by Justice Richardson:
[lit is readily apparent that 'market share' liability will fall unevenly and disproportionately upon
those manufacturers who are amenable to suit in California. On the assumption that no other state
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faces joint and several liability, while under Sindell he arguably only faces
liability for his proportional share of the market. This can lead to profound
differences to defendants and to plaintiffs. 5 '
will adopt so radical a departure from traditional tort principles, it may be concluded that under
the majority's reasoning those defendants who are brought to trial in this state will bear effective
joint responsibility for 100 percent of plaintiffs' injuries despite the fact that their 'substantial'
aggregate market share may be considerably less.
Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
" Note, Industry- Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REV. 423, 438-46
(1981). The writer presented these tables to illustrate the differences:
Table 2
Market Share Allocation of Damages - Industry-Wide Liability
Market Share 0o/
Total %7o of Market Amount of Damage
Represented by Joined for Which 07o of Total Amount
Market Defendants Defendant is of Damage for Which
Defendant Share X Total Damages Reponsible Defendant is Responsible
30
A 30%o - X $1,000,000 $ 400,000.00 40.007o
75
19
B 1900 - X 1,000,000 253,333.33 25.30o
75
8
C 8076 - X 1,000,000 106,666.67 10.7%
75
13
D 13% - X 1,000,000 173,333.33 17.3%
75
5
E 506 - X 1,000,000 66,666.67 6.7%
75
75% $1,000,000.00 100.000
Id. at 439.
Table 3
Market Share Allocation of Damages - Sindell Market Share Approach
Amount of Damages
Market for Which Defendant
Defendant Share Market Share X Total Damages Is Responsible
A 300o 30% X $1,000,000 $300,000
B 19% 1900 X 1,000,000 190,000
D 8% 80o X 1,000,000 80,000
D 13076 13% X 1,000,000 130,000
E 5% 5% X 1,000,000 50,000
750o $750,000
Id. at 444.
fl 7 4 f
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The extensive efforts made by courts and commentators to expand tradi-
tional products liability and tort doctrines to solve the identification problem
faced by DES plaintiffs are understandable. As one writer observed, "Sindell
is a classic example of the admonition that hard cases make bad law. While
pursuing a noble motive - the compensation of innocent victims of adverse
drug reactions - the Sindell court gravely overstepped the boundaries of judicial
lawmaking." 152 The same, of course, can be said for the enterprise liability
theory and the alternative liability and concert of action theories which are
logically inapplicable anyway.
The most basic reason to resist these theories is the tremendous break they
make from prior law. The causation issue is such a fundamental requirement
of products liability law that it should not be eliminated.' 3 As Dean Prosser
noted: "[the plaintiff] must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis
for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defen-
dant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result. A mere possibility
of such causation is not enough .... ,,15 These theories similarly have extended
potential liability so far that "a particular defendant may be held proportionately
liable even though mathematically it is much more likely than not that it played
no role whatever in causing plaintiffs' injuries.'
Extension of liability here would severely strain the drug companies' ability
to obtain adequate insurance coverage. Products liability insurance rates for
United States drug companies already reflect the tremendous liability
exposures."' In fact, many United States drug companies have already been
forced to self-insure because insurance companies are unwilling to underwrite
these risks.'5 The risks are large enough that at least one company is now viewed
as a poor investment risk.' 58
Despite protestations to the contrary, United States drug manufacturers
do put forth great amounts of effort and resources into research and
development.' 59 Public policy obviously favors the development of new drugs,
"See Comment, supra note 47, at 811-12.
"'As it would be by shifting the burden to the defendants, who are in no better position than are the
plaintiffs to make identification.
"'W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 41, at 241.
"'Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
16Payne, Products Liability - An Underwriter's View, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE (1977)
(published seminar, Lloyd's of London Press) at 8.
"'U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY FINAL REPORT OF THE
INSURANCE STUDY (Jan., 1977) at 3-34 (printed by Nat'l Technical Informational Services).
,'See SWEIG. supra note 1, at 2, this firm was Eli Lilly. It does not appear to have affected Lilly's stock
price significantly. See Eli Lilly & Co., Trendline's Current Market Perspective, 140 (Jan. 1982); Eli Lilly
& Co., Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks (Summer 1981).
"'See Comment, supra note 47, at 810 (estimating the average cost of a significant new drug to be $24
million).
DESWinter, 1983]
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but as each new product faces huge and seemingly unlimited liability, the
incentive to continue research is reduced. 160 One writer analyzed the harm done
society as strict liability is imposed:
There are two risks involved in the development of new drugs: (1) the
risk that unforeseen, perhaps catastrophic, injuries will result because a
new drug is used in man too soon; and (2) the risk that needless human
suffering and death will occur because a beneficial drug is withheld from
mankind too long. Absolute liability for the adverse effects of new drugs
would enlarge the latter risk to unacceptable proportions, while giving
a remedy to those injured by the former risk.'16
Thus, society as a whole is better off by not further expanding our products
liability laws in this setting.
Further doctrinal expansion will serve only a compensation function and
not a deterrence function. If we are to hold drug companies liable for latent
defects in their products, then we should at least leave the causation burden
with the plaintiff. 62 In this way the defendant who caused the harm would
be the one deterred.
As already noted, defense costs in DES cases are high, and the actual
amount received by plaintiffs low. 63 This points up the tremendous costs of
using the legal system to solve this problem. The DES cases are very complicated,
legally and medically. The costs mount up with each new case, a new jury,
a new judge, and often new attorneys must be taught the unique facts of a
DES case.
The market share and enterprise liability theories were developed for the
DES cases, but their impact could extend much further. It was observed that
"Sindell is potentially applicable in any case where identification of the manufac-
turer is impossible or where a generically similar defective product is produced
by multiple manufacturers." 6 An especially likely area of exportation would
be the over 6,000 already pending cases involving asbestos. 65
"'See Note, supra note 2, at 1004.
"'Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 756 (1980) (quoting Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 48-49, 588 P.2d 326, 341-42
(Ct. App. 1978)).
'See Note, supra note 2, at 1013-14.
'"See supra notes 69 and 70 and accompanying text. Similarly, manufacturers with small market shares
will nevertheless likely be brought into many suits after Sindell and will, as a result, face high litigation
expenses. Lnad & Mahlman, The New California 'Market Share' Theory in Drug Liability Cases, 36 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 39, 44 (1981).
'"Comment, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories - A High Water Mark in Tort Law, 1981 UTAH L. REV.
655, 671.
"'Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A.J. 827 (1980). See Hardy v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981); Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
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VI. TOWARD A PRINCIPLED APPROACH
A. FDA Regulation
While it cannot compensate the victims, the FDA should be allowed to
continue to regulate the drug industry. The suggestions to let products liability
actions take the place of federal regulation seem ludicrous in the DES context.' 6
Were DES introduced today for the use of preventing miscarriages it would
surely not be approved by the FDA. While the benefit of hindsight is difficult
to ignore, the FDA's testing procedures have been vastly improved since the
1940's. 7 The tests done in the 1940's did not generally include possible effects
on a fetus, although today the FDA would certainly require such studies,
especially for a drug meant to be given to pregnant women."6 DES would not
be approved today for use as a miscarriage preventative for the additional reason
that the drug has been proven not effective for that use. Since the Kefauver-
Harris Amendments of 1962, drugs must be safe and effective to receive FDA
approval.' 69
B. Legislative Solutions
Many observers have suggested a no-fault insurance system for product
injuries. Even the "DES Comment" recommended this, but recognized it was
within the province of the legislature.170
Most of these proposals would apply to all industries. One especially notable
proposal appears in a 1979 law review comment.1 7 ' The author proposes a
"latent technological injury compensation" system where an injured party could
go to an administrative body for relief if his injury was not discoverable within
a certain specified period after initial purchase. After this "statute of limita-
tions" ran, the plaintiff would lose his tort or products liability actions. The
plaintiff would be compensated by the administrative body upon: showing that
she was injured; tracing her injury to a type of product; and showing her in-
jury was not discoverable during the statutory period. Compensation would
be for bodily injuries including medical expenses and lost earnings but not for
pain and suffering. This system would be funded by a uniform tax on all
manufacturers. '
72
'"See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976). In general the drug company must produce animal toxicity studies along
with a protocol of proposed clinical investigations upon submission of a Notice of Claimed Investigational
Exemption for a New Drug (IND). See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1(d) (1978). The drug is then put through a three
phase clinical investigation. See Note, supra note 161, at 754.
"
6Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 323, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629. Some testimony indicated that early rat and mice studies
had discovered some effects on the fetus.
'See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
I 0FORDHAM Comment, supra note 26, at 1007. See Note, Industry- Wide Liability and Market Share
Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REV. 423, 450 (1981).
"'Note, supra note 2, at 980.
"'Id. at 1019-22. The tax would be uniform because the product defect is unknowable at time of manufacture
and therefore predictions along product types would be unreliable.
Winter, 1983] DES
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While this system has much to commend it, the authors would prefer a
system limited to the DES situation. Other industries and products, such as
asbestos, could be added later as the legislature saw fit. Such a system would
be similar to the one suggested by Justice Richardson in Sindell. " It is believed,
however, that a national system would be preferable to a state-by-state approach.
This proposed national system should be funded by a tax upon the
manufacturers who produced DES for use as a miscarriage preventative. The
tax should be equitably imposed upon them, most probably based upon total
national market share. While it is true, that this will involve some of the same
difficulties presented by the Sindell approach, figures for such a national market
are already available. 74 As with the "latent technological injury compensa-
tion system" discussed earlier, recovery should be limited to medical expenses
and lost earnings and it would, of course, displace other remedies. Hopefully,
the cooperation of the drug companies could be obtained since they have much
to gain by the system, most importantly avoiding needless defense costs and
possible awards for pain and suffering.
In conclusion, Sindell and the enterprise liability proposal were indeed noble
efforts to compensate the innocent victims of DES exposure. It is hard to imagine
plaintiffs more innocent than those who were exposed to the drug before their
birth. The judicial theories, however, wreak too much havoc upon our legal
doctrines. The solution must be of legislative origin, not judicial. The DES
identification problem must be answered finally by a policy decision. The dif-
ficulties and adverse effects of a judicial solution make the legislative one
preferable.
" See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 93.
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